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INTRODUCTION

To resist arrest is a crime. But is it a crime if the arrest resisted is
unlawful? More particularly, is a lawful arrest an issue in a trial for
resisting arrest?
This inquiry invokes the constitutional due process problem of proof
illustrated in Hoover v. Garfield Heights Municipal Court,1 decided in
September 1986 by the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth
Circuit. Hoover's Ohio state conviction for resisting arrest was vacated
because the trial court failed to instruct that a lawful arrest was an
element of the offense. The failure to so instruct was a constitutional
error, a violation of the due process principle that the state has the
burden of proving every element of an offense beyond a reasonable doubt.
Moreover, a failure to instruct the jury that it had to find that the arrest
was lawful in order to convict of resisting arrest could not be considered
a harmless error.
The Hoover court's analysis predicates the due process question on a
state law determination of whether lawfulness of the arrest is an element
of the offense of resisting arrest. Thus the extent to which a state
prosecution for resisting arrest presents a due process issue depends upon
the state's definition of the crime of resisting arrest. The extent to which
the states have made a lawful arrest an element of resisting arrest, and
thus a due process issue, is the thrust of this article. While some courts

* Professor of Law, California Western School of Law. Visiting Professor, Vanderbilt
University Law School, Spring 1988. B.A., Oklahoma City University; J.D., University of

Oklahoma; LL.M., Columbia University.
1 802 F.2d 168 (6th Cir. 1986).
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have spoken in terms of whether a lawful arrest is an element of the
resisting arrest crime, others have spoken in terms of whether an
arrestee has the right to resist an unlawful arrest. Both perspectives will
afford insight on whether lawful arrest must be proven to convict for
resistance. This "defined element" approach as an exclusive due process
consideration, however, is inadequate. Even if a lawful arrest is not a
formal element of a state definition of the resisting arrest crime, an
unlawful arrest may be a material fact, and therefore, relevant to the
critical due process interests at stake. Before further discussion of the
relevancy of lawful arrest in a resisting arrest prosecution, a more
detailed analysis of Hoover is appropriate.

II.

HOOVER

v. GARFIELD HEIGHTS MUNICIPAL COURT

Police officers responding to a call regarding a domestic disturbance
arrived at an apartment house to find petitioner Hoover and Barbara
Forbes yelling at one another. When one of the officers sought to remove
petitioner, Hoover punched the officer in the face. Petitioner was then
arrested for assaulting an officer and for resisting arrest, but not for
domestic violence. Petitioner was found guilty at a jury trial. He was
fined $400 and sentenced to 60 days in the Cleveland House of Corrections on each charge, the sentences to be served consecutively. Petitioner's convictions were affirmed by an Ohio Court of Appeals. The Ohio
Supreme Court dismissed his appeal for want of a substantial constitutional question. Petitioner then filed for habeas relief from these convictions in the U.S. District Court.
Among other errors, Hoover cited the trial court's failure to instruct
that the underlying arrest must be found lawful to convict for resistance.
The district court, although finding an instructional error in this regard,
denied habeas relief. The U.S. District Court and the Ohio Appellate
Court found the trial court instructions to be a "misstatement of the law,"
but ruled the erroneous instructions constituted harmless error because
the arrest was lawful.2 The Court of Appeals concluded the error could
not be harmless and reversed.
The Sixth Circuit's analysis began with the familiar In re Winship
proposition that the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment
requires the state to prove beyond a reasonable doubt every fact neces3
sary to constitute the crime with which the defendant is charged.
Additionally, in determining what facts must be proved beyond a
reasonable doubt, the state legislature's definition of the elements of the

Id. at 170,
a Id. at 173. In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 362 (1970).
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4
offense is usually dispositive. Operating on these constitutional principles, the Sixth Circuit found that the Ohio statute defining resisting
arrest, Ohio Rev. Code section 2921.33 (A), clearly makes a "lawful
arrest" an element which the state must prove to establish the crime of
resisting arrest. 5 Moreover, Ohio courts had previously acknowledged
that a lawful arrest was a prerequisite to a conviction for this offense.
The trial court, in refusing to instruct that the prosecution had to prove
the lawfulness of the arrest, cited the Ohio Supreme Court decision of
6
City of Columbus v. Harris. The Harrisopinion relied on another Ohio
7
Supreme Court decision, City of Columbus v. Fraley. The Fraleydecision,
reviewing a resisting arrest conviction under a Columbus city ordinance,
held that a citizen may not use force to resist arrest by a known officer
who is engaged in the performance of his duty, "whether or not the arrest
''
is illegal under the circumstances. 8 However, Hoover's resisting arrest
conviction was based on a state statute, Ohio Rev. Code section 2921.33,
rather than on a city ordinance. Thus, the Fraley decision was ruled
inapposite. Because the city ordinance contained no specific lawful arrest
requirement, the Ohio Supreme Court was free to interpret the ordinance
as prohibiting violence against a police officer attempting to make any
arrest whether lawful or unlawful. The statute under which Hoover had
been convicted clearly did require a lawful arrest and did not prohibit
9
resisting an unlawful arrest.
Having determined that a lawful arrest was an element of the state
resistance crime under which Hoover was tried, the Sixth Circuit
concluded that the trial court's erroneous instructions constituted constitutional error. The trial court's failure to instruct that the state had to
prove the element of lawful arrest violated the due process principle that
no one may be convicted of a crime absent proof beyond a reasonable
10
doubt of every fact necessary to constitute the crime. Constitutional
error, however, does not necessarily require conviction reversal. The
Hoover court considered whether this constitutional error required reversal of the conviction, or whether it could be deemed harmless error under
the doctrine of Chapman v. California." The Hoover court noted that the
federal courts of appeal disagree as to whether a trial court's failure to
instruct on an essential element of an offense may be considered harmless
error. After reviewing the reasonings of these decisions, the Hoover court

4 Id. McMillian v. Pennsylvania, 477 U.S. 79, 86 (1986).
5 802 F.2d at 173.
' Id. City of Columbus v. Harris, 44 Ohio St. 2d 89, 338 N.E.2d 530 (1975).
7 802 F.2d at 173. City of Columbus v. Fraley, 41 Ohio St. 2d 173, 324 N.E.2d 735, cert.
denied, 423 U.S. 872 (1975).
a 41 Ohio St. 2d at 180, 324 N.E.2d at 740.
9 802 F.2d at 174.
10 Id.

11 386 U.S. 18 (1967).
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found guidance in the U.S. Supreme Court's discussion of harmless error
in Rose v. Clark.12 In Rose, the Supreme Court observed that a harmless
error analysis would not apply if a trial court directed a verdict for the
state in a criminal case. 13 Using this guide, the Hoover court reasoned
that when an instruction prevents a jury from considering a material
issue, the instruction is the equivalent to a directed verdict on that issue
and therefore could not be considered harmless. "iT)he trial court's
failure to instruct the jury that it had to find that Hoover's arrest was
lawful in order to convict him of resisting arrest prevented the jury from
considering that element and constituted a directed verdict on it."14 Thus

the court concluded that this instructional error could not be considered
harmless and granted habeas relief.
The Hoover analysis, whether there is a constitutional due process
right to an instruction that a lawful arrest must be proved to convict for
resisting arrest, depends upon the definition of the resistance offense
charged. In Ohio, a person charged with resisting arrest in violation of
the Columbus city ordinance would not be entitled to such an instruction.
If that same person, however, were charged with resisting arrest under
the state statute, he would be entitled to such an instruction. The
constitutional principles as applied in Hoover lead to an inquiry as to the
extent to which resisting arrest is defined to require a lawful arrest, and
to observations as to whether the due process interests are well served
thereby.
III.

THE RIGHT To RESIST AN UNLAWFUL ARREST

Although many courts have addressed the issue in terms of whether a
lawful arrest is a necessary element of the crime of resisting arrest, most
courts have spoken in terms of whether there is a right to resist an
unlawful arrest. The common law rule is that a person has a right to
resist an unlawful arrest. 15 It is useful to an understanding of the
common law rule to have some appreciation of what is meant by an
"unlawful arrest."
The authority of an officer to arrest is granted by statute and delineated to specific situations. 16 A series of important judicial decisions have

12 106 S. Ct. 3101 (1986).

Id. at 3106.
802 F.2d at 177.
," Annot., 44 A.L.R.2d 1078 (1972).
16 See, e.g., OKLA. STAT. tit. 22, § 196 (1982)(when an officer may arrest without a
warrant); CAL. PENAL CODE § 836 (West 1985); N.Y. CaM. PRoc. §§ 120.20, 140.05, 140.10
(McKinney 1981). The prevailing rule is that while an officer may arrest with a warrant for
any crime, an officer is permitted to arrest without a warrant for a misdemeanor or felony
committed in his presence as well as for a felony not committed in his presence if reasonable
1s

14
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fashioned the constitutional limits on the lawful seizure of a person by an
officer. 17 Generally, an arrest is unlawful if the arresting officer has no
probable cause to make an arrest. 18 Additionally, an arrest under
authority of a warrant may be unlawful if the warrant is facially
defective 19 or, if facially sufficient, was unlawfully issued. 20 An arrest not
authorized by statute, executed without probable cause or executed upon
an invalid warrant, is likewise unlawful. The officer's "good faith" does
not operate to21make an unlawful arrest, one lacking in probable cause, a
lawful arrest.
Another definition is in order. What is meant by "resisting" an officer?
Basically any action or inaction by an arrestee which impedes, or makes
more difficult, the arrest is within the meaning of "resistance" and
related offenses of assault on an officer. Resistive conduct may be
categorized as an arrestee's affirmative physical act toward an officer, an
arrestee's passive conduct, or an arrestee's mere verbal resistance. The
broad scope of resistance is illustrated by the following acts which have
23
been held to be criminal: striking an officer; 22 scuffling; pulling away

gounds exist for making the arrest. See United States v. Watson, 423 U.S. 411 (1976);
Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 156 (1925).
17 See e.g., Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968); United States v. Edwards, 415 U.S. 800

(1973); United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218 (1973); See generally WHITEBREAD,

CRIMINAL

LIMITs ON LAWFUL SEIZURE, § 2.03 (1980).
s See, e.g., Terry, 392 U.S. 1. The test for determining lawfulness of an arrest is whether
at the moment the arrest was made, facts and circumstances within the arresting officer's
knowledge, and of which he had reasonably trustworthy information, were sufficient to
warrant a prudent man to believe the arrestee had committed, or was committing, a crime.
Cooks v. State, 699 P.2d 653 (Okla. Crim. App. 1985).
I
See, e.g., Holbird v. State, 650 P.2d 66 (Okla. Crim. App. 1982)(arrest warrant issued
in Oklahoma is invalid if executed outside Oklahoma).
20 See, e.g., Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443 (1971)(warrant invalid because it
was not issued by a neutral magistrate); Franks v. Delaware, 438 U.S. 154 (1978)(false
statements in affidavit for warrant invalidate warrant).
" The officer's "good faith" in executing an unlawful arrest may be a defense in deciding
if the officer is guilty of false arrest or some other tort. Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547 (1967).
Although there is no probable cause to arrest, the arresting officer is not liable for violation
of the civil rights of the arrestee if the officer believed in good faith that arrest was lawful
and if this belief was reasonable. Lindsey v. Louglin, 616 F. Supp. 449, 452 (E.D.N.Y. 1985).
The officer's "good faith" may also be relevant in deciding if the evidence obtained by an
unlawful arrest is admissible in a prosecution of the arrestee. Massachusetts v. Sheppard,
468 U.S. 981 (1984); United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897 (1984). See also United States v.
Williams, 622 F.2d 830 (5th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1127 (1981). See generally
Comment, The Good Faith Exception: The Seventh Circuit Limits the Exclusionary Rule in
the Administrative Context, 61 DEN. L.J. 597 (1984).
22 See, e.g., People v. Henderson, 58 Cal. App. 3d 349, 129 Cal. Rptr. 844 (1976)(assault
upon an officer with a deadly weapon).
23 State v. Best, 91 W. Va. 559, 113 S.E. 919 (1922)(slight pushing is obstruction).
PROCEDURE: CONSTITUTIONAL
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from an officer; 24 blocking an officer's path; 25 refusing to obey an officer's
orders; 26 going limp;27 remaining seated; 28 verbal threats of interfer-

ence; 29 or hindering profanity.3 0 The key is uncooperative conduct.
At common law, the determination of guilt for resisting arrest depended on whether the officer was performing a lawful duty of his office.
The courts reasoned that an unlawful arrest, one without a valid warrant
or probable cause, was not a "duty" of an officer. 3 1 If an officer is not
performing a lawful duty, the arrestee has a right to resist and defend
against the unlawful arrest. 32 The genesis for this centuries-old common
law rule is the theory that the unlawful arrest, an action by an official in
excess of his authority, constituted a trespass. This trespass by the official
was a "provocation" to the arrestee, justifying the use of physical force in
repelling the officer's trespass.
The theoretical application of the rule was demonstrated in a 1666
English decision, Hopkin Huggett's Case.33 There, the defendant and
others had killed a constable who was illegally attempting to impress a
man into the Army. Although the victim of the impressment apparently
offered no resistance, others had sought physically to prevent the
constable's action. Because their efforts had resulted in the death of the
constable, they were charged with murder. The court, however, stated
that "if a man be unduly arrested or restrained of his liberty [it] is a
provocation to all other men ...

to endeavor his rescue." 34 Because the

defendant's initial intrusion, interference with the officer's unlawful

24 See, e.g., In re Culver, 69 Cal. 2d 898, 447 P.2d 633, 73 Cal. Rptr. 393 (1968)(fleeing

arrest is resistance or obstruction).
25 See, e.g., State v. Beck, 5 Conn. Cir. Ct. 587, 259 A.2d 149 (1969); Clovis v. Archie, 60

N.M. 239, 290 P.2d 1075 (1955)(blocking path of officer is obstruction).
26 See State v. Avnayim, 1 Conn. Cir. Ct. 34, 185 A.2d 295 (1962)(refusal to obey police
orders was resistance); Des Moines v. Reiter, 251 Iowa 1206, 102 N.W.2d 363 (1960)(refusal
to accept ticket); State v. Keehn, 135 Minn. 211, 160 N.W. 666 (1916)(refusal to accept
summons).
27 See, e.g., People v. Raby, 40 Ill. 2d 392, 240 N.E.2d 595, cert. denied, 393 U.S. 1083
(1968)(arrestee assumed limp posture).
28 People v. Knight, 35 Misc. 2d 216, 228 N.Y.S. 2d 981 (1962)(arrestee laid down);
People v. Schrehr, 88 111. App. 2d 287, 232 N.E.2d 566 (1967)(arrestee sat down).
29 See, e.g., People v. Maggio, 140 Cal. App. 246, 35 P.2d 369 (1934); State v. Jones, 202
Kan. 31, 446 P.2d 851 (1968).
30 State v. Harris, 4 Conn. Cir. Ct. 534, 236 A.2d 479 (1967); State v. Estes, 185 N.C. 752,
117 S.E. 581 (1923).
" State v. Cook, 663 P.2d 20 (Okla. Crim. App. 1983). A peace officer is a trespasser
when he attempts to arrest for a misdemeanor not committed or attempted in his presence
without an arrest warrant, and the individual may resist the arrest. See also Jackson v.
Superior Court, 98 Cal. App. 2d 183, 219 P.2d 879, 883 (1950); People v. Curtis, 70 Cal. 2d
347, 450 P.2d 33, 38, 74 Cal. Rptr. 713, 718 (1969).
32 John Bad Elk v. United States, 177 U.S. 529, 534 (1900); see Annot., supra note 15.
33 84 Rev. Rep. 1082 (K.B. 1666).
34 Id.
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seizure was justified he was not guilty of murder, but of manslaughter. In
another early case, The Queen v. Tooley, 35 the defendant and others had
interfered with a constable, causing his death, while the constable was
attempting an unlawful arrest. Tooley's murder conviction was set aside
by the court because "if anyone against the law imprison a man, he is an
offender." 36 The court reasoned the constable's offending conduct "to be a
sufficient provocation," 37 justifying the defendant's interference. The
English courts extended this principle to non-homicide cases. Where an
unlawful arrest by a constable provoked an assault on the constable, not
resulting in homicide, the English courts held that there was no crime
committed by the arrestee because the assault was excused by the
3
officer's unlawful arrest.

8

The early courts in this country adopted the same premise: an unlawful
arrest was deemed a wrongful and provocative attack, justifying resistance by the arrestee. By 1900, this rule was so firmly established that it
was acknowledged by the U.S. Supreme Court in John Bad Elk v.United
States.39 In that case, the Supreme Court reversed a conviction for
murder of an officer because the trial "court clearly erred in charging that
the policeman had the right to arrest the plaintiff in error, and to use
such force as was necessary to accomplish the arrest, and that the
plaintiff in error had no right to resist it." '40 The court stated this rule: "If
the officer had no right to arrest, the other party might resist the illegal
attempt to arrest him, using no more force than was absolutely necessary
to repel the assault constituting the attempt to arrest."4' If such resistance causes the death of the officer, "the offense of the party resisting
arrest would be reduced from what would have been murder to manslaughter." 42 In 1948, the Supreme Court again had occasion to observe
that "[o]ne has an undoubted right to resist an unlawful arrest, and
43
courts will uphold the right of resistance in proper cases."
The resistance right, as it has developed, means that the subject of an
unlawful arrest is privileged to resist with reasonable force, that which is
"absolutely necessary to repel the assault constituting the attempt to
arrest."44 Force in revenge, or force disproportionate to effect escape, is

" 92 Eng. Rep. 349 (K.B. 1710).
36

Id. at 353.

Id.
" See, e.g., The King v. Curvan, 168 Eng. Rep. 1213 (K.B. 1826); The King v. Thompson,
168 Eng. Rep. 1193 (K.B. 1825).
39 177 U.S. 529 (1900).
37

40

Id. at 534.

41

Id. at 535 (citation omitted).

42

Id. at 534.

13

United States v. Di Re, 332 U.S. 581, 594 (1948).

44 Annot., supra note 15. See, e.g., John Bad Elk v. United States, 177 U.S. 529, 535

(1900); State v. Cadena, 9 Ariz. App. 369, 452 P.2d 534 (1969); Morris v. Commonwealth,
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not privileged. 45 If only reasonable force is used, the resistance is excused.
If the arrestor is killed by the resistance, the killing is not murder, but
46
manslaughter because the killing was provoked by the unlawful arrest.

The courts have described the resistance as a limited self-defense,
justifying reasonable force to avoid an unlawful seizure. 4 7 Moreover, the
resistance right has not been extended to situations where the arrest is
under a warrant, facially sufficient, but containing a legal defect or
otherwise technically defective. 48 It would appear that resistance, as a
kind of self-defense, is not justified when the officer appears to have
authority by virtue of a facially sufficient warrant.
In summary, the resistance right is predicated upon the absence of
lawful action by the officer. If the officer's unlawful action provokes a
reasonable resistive force, it is deemed justified and not criminal.
Because the resistance right is grounded upon the absence of a lawful
arrest, it follows that a lawful arrest is an essential element which must
be proved to convict one of resisting arrest. In jurisdictions adhering to
the general common law resistance right, it would be, under Hoover, a
constitutional due process violation if the jury was not instructed that the
state had to prove the element of lawful arrest.
The common law resistance rule, however, is no longer universal in
American jurisdictions. The number of jurisdictions adhering to the
resistance right has declined significantly, especially since the promulgation of the Model Penal Code by the American Law Institute (A.L.I.) in
1958. According to the Model Penal Code: "The use of force is not
justifiable to resist an arrest which the actor knows is being made by a
peace officer, although the arrest is unlawful." 49 The A.L.I.'s comment in
support of this departure from existing law states that it "should be
possible to provide adequate remedies against illegal arrest."5o Such
remedies include civil tort actions by the arrestee against the officer or

411 S.W.2d 678 (Ky. 1967); Jones v. State, 4 Md. App. 616, 244 A.2d 459 (1968); People v.
Gray, 23 Mich. App. 139, 178 N.W.2d 172 (1970); State v. Messley, 366 S.W.2d 390 (Mo.
1963); Long v. State, 223 Tenn. 238, 443 S.W.2d 476 (1969); Banner v. Commonwealth, 204
Va. 640, 133 S.E.2d 305 (1963).
'5 State v. Miller, 253 Minn. 112, 91 N.W.2d 138 (1958)(disproportionate resistance);
People v. McNeil, 21 A.D. 2d 1, 247 N.Y.S.2d 734, affd, 15 N.Y.2d 717, 204 N.E.2d 648, 256
N.Y.S.2d 614 (1964)(revenge); Shelton v. State, 3 Tenn. Crim. App. 310, 460 S.W.2d 869
(1970)(unnecessary force).
46 See Annot. supra note 15. There is authority in a few states justifying the use of deadly
force merely to prevent arrest. See, e.g., Perdue v. State, 5 Ga. App. 821, 63 S.E. 922 (1909);
State v. Bethuen, 112 S.C. 100, 99 S.E. 753 (1919).
47 State v. Wright, 1 N.C. App. 479, 162 S.E.2d 56, affd, 274 N.C. 380, 163 S.E.2d 897
(1968).
48 Id.
49 MODEL PENAL CODE § 3.04 (2)(a)(i)(Proposed Official Draft 1962)(Tent. Draft No. 8,
1958).
50 MODEL PENAL CODE § 3.04 (2)(a)(i)(Tent. Draft No. 8, 1958).
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administrative review of police conduct. The thrust of the A.L.I.'s
recommendation is a preference for redress in court and administrative
procedures rather than physical force. At least twenty-one jurisdictions
have followed the example of the Model Penal Code, providing by statute
no justification for forceful resistance to an unlawful arrest by a known
officer. 5' At least six jurisdictions5 2have, by judicial decision, abandoned
the common law resistance right
If a legislature disallows a privilege to resist an unlawful arrest, does
it follow that a lawful arrest is not an essential element of the resisting
arrest offense? More precisely, does legislative repeal of the resistance
right eliminate any constitutional requirement for an instruction that a
lawful arrest is necessary to convict for resisting arrest? The answer to
these questions is not clear given the diverse views taken by the courts in
jurisdictions where the resistance justification has been statutorily
abrogated.
IV.

WITH

No

RESISTANCE RIGHT, AN UNLAWFUL ARREST IS AUTHORIZED

Legislative abrogation of the resistance right is manifested typically in
a statutory provision under the rubric or justification that a person is "not
authorized" to use force in resisting a known officer. Often the statutory
definition of the crime of resisting arrest is the same traditional language: it is a crime to resist or obstruct a known officer in the performance of his duty, or resist or obstruct the performance of any authorized
act by an officer. What is the impact of the statutory change in justification on the definition of a resistance offense?
The answer, according to the Illinois courts, is that a lawful arrest is
not a necessary element of the resistance crime. Although the Illinois
Criminal Code, Section 31-1, makes it a crime to knowingly resist or

1' ALA.

CODE Tit. 13A

§ 3-28 (1982);

ALASKA STAT. § 11.81.400 (1983); ARuZ. REV. STAT.

ANN. § 13-404(B) (1978); ARK. STAT. ANN. § 41-512(1) (1977); CoLo. REV. STAT. § 18-8-103(2)
(1986); CONN. GEN STAT. § 53a-23 (1972); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 464(d) (1974); FLA. STAT.
ANN. § 776.051(1) (West 1976); HAW. REV. STAT. § 703-304(4)(a) (1976); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 38
§ 7-7(a) (Smith-Hurd 1972); IOWA CODE ANN. § 804.12 (West 1978); KAN. STAT. ANN.
§ 21-3217 (1981); Ky. REV. STAT. § 503.060(1) (Baldwin 1925); MoNr. CODE ANN. § 94-3-108
(1977); NEB. REV. STAT. § 28-904(2) (1985); N.Y. PENAL LAW § 35.27 (McKinney 1975 & Supp
1987); N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-05-03(1)(1976); OR. REV. STAT. § 161.260; 18 (1985); PA. CONS.
STAT. § 505(b)(1)(i) (1983); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. § 22-11-5 (1979); TEx. PENAL CODE ANN.

§ 9.31 (B)(2) (Vernon 1974).
52 Commonwealth v. Moreira, 388 Mass. 596, 447 N.E.2d 1224 (1983); Miller v. State,
462 P.2d 421,426-27 (Alaska 1969); State v. Richardson, 95 Idaho 446,511 P.2d 263, 266-68
(1973), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1163 (1974); State v. Thomas, 262 N.W.2d 607, 611-12 (Iowa
1978)(judicially applied before effective date of statutory abrogation); State v. Koonce, 89
N.J. Super. 169, 214 A.2d 428, 433-36 (App. Div. 1965), approved in State v. Mulvihill, 57
N.J. 151,270 A.2d 277, 279 (1970); City of Columbus v. Fraley, 41 Ohio St. 2d 173, 324 N.E.
2d 735, 739-40, cert. denied, 423 U.S. 872 (1975).
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obstruct the performance by a known officer of "any authorized act within
his official capacity," 53 Section 7-7 disallows forceful resistance even if
the arrest is unlawful.5 4 Given this latter enactment, the Illinois Supreme Court in People v. Locken held that the Legislature "intended that
the making of an unlawful arrest is to be considered an 'authorized
act."' 55 As another Illinois decision reasoned, "authorized act" in the
statutory definition of the resistance crime means only whether the
officer is generally "endowed with [the] authority to make an arrest," not
6
whether the specific arrest was lawful or unlawful5
Similar logic was employed by the Second Circuit construing 18 U.S.C.
§ 111, which makes it a felony to interfere with a federal officer engaged
in the "performance of his official duties."57 This performance of duties
refers generally to whether he is "acting within the scope of what the
agent is employed to do." 58 Thus, an officer, "even if effecting an arrest
without probable cause, is still engaged in the performance of his official
duties, provided he is not on a 'frolic of his own.'"59
Because the resistance right is a court-made rule, the courts can
unmake it. The courts in several jurisdictions have done just that. A New
Jersey court in State v. Koonce,60 persuaded by the arguments against the
common law resistance right, disallowed such a privilege without legislative enactment. It concluded that a person "may not use force to resist"
a known officer engaged in the "performance of his duties, whether or not
the arrest is illegal."61 The courts in at least five other jurisdictions have
also disallowed any resistance right.62 The disallowance of a resistance
right, according to these courts, renders it immaterial whether the
particular arrest resisted was lawful. Thus, a lawful arrest is not an
essential element of the offense in those jurisdictions.
V.

EVEN WITH No RESISTANCE RIGHT, A LAWFUL ARREST Is

ESSENTIAL To CONVICT

In contrast to the reasoning of the Illinois courts, New York state
courts have ruled that a lawful arrest is a necessary element to convict for
resisting arrest, even though the legislature expressly disallowed a

63 ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 38

31-1 (Smith-Hurd 1961).
54 Id. at § 7-7.
55 59 Ill.
2d 459, 464-65, 322 N.E.2d 51, 54 (1975).
56 People v. Shinn, 5 Il. App. 3d 468, 472, 283 N.E.2d 502, 505 (1972).

57 18 U.S.C. § 111 (1982).
5 United States v. Heliczer, 373 F.2d 241, 245 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 388 U.S. 817

(1967).
" United States v. Martinez, 465 F.2d 79, 82 (2d Cir. 1972).
60 89 N.J. Super. 169, 214 A.2d 428 (1963).
61 89 N.J. Super. at 173, 214 A.2d at 436.
62

See supra note 53.
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forceful resistance right. In 1968, the New York Legislature abrogated
the resistance right with the enactment of the so-called "no-sock"
principle, Penal Law section 35.27. Although this statute provides that a
person "may not use physical force to resist arrest, whether authorized or
unauthorized, '" 63 it did not, the courts reasoned, expand the substantive
scope of the resisting arrest offense. 64 As to the definition of that offense,
the New York courts have held that "[an authorized arrest is an
65
indispensable element of a resisting arrest offense." That crime "does
'
not occur if the arrest is illegal or unlawful." The New York misdemeanor resistance offense is defined in terms of attempting to prevent a
'67
Felony assault on
known officer from effecting an "authorized arrest.
to an officer while
injury
physical
of
causing
terms
in
is
defined
an officer
68
"performing a lawful duty."

In view of this language, the New York

courts have concluded that the "arrest must in fact be one that is
authorized by the rules of arrest."69 Absent a lawful warrant or probable
cause, the arresting officer is neither effecting an "authorized arrest," nor
"performing a lawful duty." Clearly, a lawful arrest is an essential
element for the resistance offenses in New York.
The courts in Connecticut and Pennsylvania have adopted a similar
view. Both state legislatures enacted "no-sock" statutes prohibiting
forceful resistance to "a legal or illegal arrest."70 Nevertheless, the
Connecticut courts have held that if the arrest is illegal, there can be no
crime of interference.7 1 The Pennsylvania resisting arrest offense and
72
assault on an officer offense are defined in terms of a "lawful arrest."

63

N.Y.

PENAL LAW

§ 35.27 (McKinney 1975 & Supp. 1983-84).

4 People v. Lyke, 72 Misc. 2d 1046, 1049, 340 N.Y.S.2d 357, 362 (Broome County Ct.
1973); People v. Doe, 85 Misc.2d 592, 595, 380 N.Y.S.2d 549, 554 (N.Y. City Ct. 1976). See
also People v. Lyke, 72 Misc. 2d 1046, 1048, 340 N.Y.S.2d 357, 360 (Broome County Ct.
1973); People v. Lattanzio, 35 A.D.2d 313, 314, 316 N.Y.S.2d 163, 165 (1970); People v.
Simms, 36 A.D.2d 23, 25, 319 N.Y.S.2d 144, 146 (1971).
65 People v. Ailey, 76 Misc. 2d 589, 595, 350 N.Y.S.2d 981, 989 (N.Y. City Ct. 1974).
66 People v. Stevenson, 31 N.Y.2d 108, 111, 286 N.E.2d 445, 448, 335 N.Y.S.2d 52, 56
(1972).
67 N.Y. PENAL LAW § 205.30 (McKinney 1975 & Supp. 1983-84).
" N.Y. PENAL LAW § 120.05(3)(McKinney 1975 & Supp. 1983-84).
69 Id. at § 205.30 (Practice Commentaries).
71 CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 53a-23 (West 1972); 18 PA. CONS. STAT. § 505(b)(1983): "The
use of force is not justifiable under this section: (i) to resist an arrest which the actor knows
is being made by a peace officer, although the arrest is unlawfu(;... "
71 State v. Anonymous (1977-5), 34 Conn. Supp. 531, 375 A.2d 417, 425 (1977).
72 18 PA. CONS. STAT. § 2702(a)(1983): "A person is guilty of aggravated assault if
he: ...(3) attempts to cause or intentionally or knowingly causes bodily injury to a police
officer making or attempting to make a lawful arrest...." 18 PA. CONS. STAT. § 5104 (1983):
"A person commits a misdemeanor of the second degree if, with the intent of preventing a
public servant from effecting a lawful arrest ... , the person creates a substantial risk of
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According to the Pennsylvania courts, the disallowance of forceful
resistance enactment "cannot render the legality of the arrest irrele73
vant.
VI.

WITH

No

RESISTANCE RIGHT, RESISTANCE

Is

ASSAULT OR BATrERY

In addition to the polar extremes of New York and Illinois, another
position exists regarding whether a lawful arrest remains a necessary
element of a resistance offense after enactments disallowing forceful
resistance. The California Supreme Court, in People v. Curtis, concluded
that the statutory disallowance of forceful resistance 74 eliminated the
common law defense, but it did not "make such resistance a new
substance crime." 75 The resistance offenses are defined by the statutes
which create such offenses. California, by statute, makes it a felony to
commit a battery against a known "officer engaged in the performance of
his duties."7 6 Because an officer has no duty to make an unlawful arrest,
the statute was read as "excluding unlawful arrests from its definition of
'duty."' Therefore, if the officer is engaged in an unlawful arrest when the
resistance occurs, such resistance cannot be punished as felony battery
against an officer.V7 A lawful performance of official duty, i.e., a lawful
arrest, is a necessary element of this crime.
However, the court in Curtisreasoned that the general crimes of simple
assault and battery contain no element requiring that the person assaulted be engaged in lawful performance of official duty. Therefore, if an
officer engaged in an unlawful arrest is assaulted, the attacker can be
convicted of simple assault or battery, but not of a felony assault on an
officer engaged in the performance of an official duty.7S

bodily injury to the public servant or anyone else, or employs means justifying or requiring
substantial force to overcome the resistance."
"' Commonwealth v. Bartman, 240 Pa. Super. 495, 367 A.2d 1121, 1124 (1976). See also
Commonwealth v. Stortecky, 238 Pa. Super. 117, 352 A.2d 491, 493 (1975)(Huffman, J.,
dissenting) ("The requirement that the arrest be lawful, therefore, constitutes an element
of [resisting an arrest and assault on a police officer]. . . [lIt is also a 'material element of
[the] offense."')
71 CAL. PENAL CODE § 834a (West 1970): "If a person has knowledge, or by the exercise of
reasonable care, should have knowledge, that he is being arrested by a peace officer, it is the
duty of such person to refrain from using force or any weapon to resist such arrest."
75 People v, Curtis, 70 Cal. 2d 347, 349, 450 P.2d 33, 37, 74 Cal. Rptr. 713, 717 (1969).
716The applicable section, CAL. PENAL CODE § 243.1 (West Supp. 1984), now states:
When a battery is committed against the person of a custodial officer as defined
in Section 831 of the Penal Code, and the person committing the offense knows or
reasonably should know that such victim is a custodial officer engaged in the
performance of his duties, and such custodial officer is engaged in the performance

of his duties, the offense shall be punished by imprisonment in the state prison.
77 Curtis, 450 P.2d at 38, 74 Cal. Rptr. at 718.
78 Id.
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The Curtis conclusion ignores the resistance right foundational theory
that the officer, executing an unlawful arrest, is a trespasser. Generally,
reasonable force in defense against the wrongful trespasser is justified
and excusable. 79 It would seem under this general trespass theory that
reasonable resistance force would be justified, thus preventing a conviction for simple assault or battery. Be that as it may, the California courts
hold that a lawful arrest, or other lawful performance, is a necessary
element to convict for felony battery on an officer. Resistance to an
unlawful arrest, however, might be punishable as assault or battery
because the Legislature disallowed a resistance justification.
VII.

DUE PROCESS BErrER SERVED: BEYOND FORMALISM AND FEDERALISM

The Winship due process requirement of "proof beyond a reasonable
doubt of every fact necessary to constitute the crime ...

charged,"80 as

applied in Hoover, has at least one limiting aspect: The due process issue
turns upon each jurisdiction's definition of the crime of resisting arrest.
While that aspect may be viewed as appropriate deference to federalism,
"which demands '[t]olerance for a spectrum of state procedures dealing
with a common problem of law enforcement,"'' it places arbitrary and
drastic consequences on technical definitions which vary from jurisdiction to jurisdiction, or, as in Ohio, depending on whether the same
conduct of resistance is prosecuted under a state statute or city ordinance.
From the vantage point of the innocent person who is subjected to an
unlawful arrest, the Winship - Hoover federalism analysis is capricious
and fundamentally unfair. Moreover, it is submitted that Hoover's
exclusive dependence on a jurisdiction's formal definition of the resistance crime does not serve the values and objectives upon which
Winship's reasonable doubt standard was based.
It is important to grasp the practical consequence where a lawful arrest
is not an element of resisting arrest. Then there need be no instruction
that a lawful arrest must be proven beyond a reasonable doubt in order
to convict. In a resistance prosecution, that would mean there is no issue
of a lawful or unlawful arrest. If lawfulness is not an issue, the jury as

" See generally R. PERKINS AND R. BOYCE, PERKINS AND BOYCE ON CRIMINAL LAW 1131

(3d ed. 1982)[Hereinafter cited as Perkins and Boyce]. Unless the person making the arrest
has the authority to do so, any force used to secure the apprehension is unprivileged.
Unprivileged application of force constitutes a battery. Id. at 554. Touching to effect an
unlawful arrest is battery. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 118 comment b (1965).
Furthermore, the privilege to use force in self-defense is not limited to prevention of death
or great bodily harm. The privilege to use reasonable nondeadly force as a defense against
nondeadly force is well established. State v. Evenson, 122 Iowa 88, 97 N.W. 979 (1904). See
State v. Sherman, 16 R.I. 631, 18 A. 1040 (1889).
"o 397 U.S. 358, 364 (1970).
" McMillian v. Pennsylvania, 477 U.S. 79, 88 (1986).
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fact-finder need not be instructed as to what is a lawful arrest. Without
this guidance, and with evidence going to the lawfulness of the arrest
excluded as immaterial, the fact-finder could not appreciate any argument that the accused was an innocent person, reacting defensively and
understandably against a perceived unlawful denial of liberty.
Removal of consideration of the lawfulness of the arrest, which goes to
the state of mind of the accused, is tantamount to exclusion of a material
fact. The Supreme Court has held that Winship's due process requirement
of proof beyond a reasonable doubt of "every fact necessary to constitute
the crime," does apply "to facts not formally identified as elements of the
offense charged."8 2 Surely the state of mind of the resisting arrestee is a
relevant fact of the prosecution of such an offense. It is a maxim of
Anglo-American jurisprudence that mens rea (a blameworthy state of
mind) is essential to convict.8
In Mullaney v. Wilbur, the Supreme Court held that "the Due Process
Clause requires the prosecution to prove beyond a reasonable doubt the
absence of the heat of passion or sudden provocation when the issue is
properly presented in a homicide case."8 4 The ancient phrase, "heat of

passion," means that at the time of the alleged criminal act, the
defendant's reason is disturbed by passion to an extent that might make
ordinary men act irrationally without due deliberation or reflection, and
from passion rather than judgment.8 5 This passion, a state of reduced
culpability, must result from a provocation sufficient to inflame an
ordinary person as to tend to cause him for the moment to act from
passion, not reason, that is, sufficient to tend to deprive a reasonable
person of self-control. 86 Provocation, in the homicide context, is a mitigating factor, reducing the offense from murder to manslaughter.
Provocation was the operative principle when the Supreme Court
reversed a murder conviction in John Bad Elk v. United States.87 Because
the officer was attempting an unlawful arrest, and was killed by the
resistance of the arrestee, "the offense of the party resisting arrest would
be reduced from what would have been murder ... to manslaughter." s
89
The unlawful arrest is the provocation, justifying the resistance.
Although the killing was excessive force in resistance, resistance to an
unlawful attack reduces the blameworthiness of the state of mind.
While provocation, in the homicide context, reduces the offense to

82

Id.

at 86.

s Ladner v. United States, 358 U.S. 169, 175-76 (1958).
Mullaney v. Wilbur, 421 U.S. 648 (1975).

85 W. LAFAVE & A. ScoTT, CRIMINAL LAW 653, n. 5 (2d ed. 1986).
88

PERKINS

&

BOYCE,

supra note 79, at 87.

87 177 U.S. 529 (1900).

at 534.
"9 See King. v. Curvan, 168 Eng. Rep. 1213 (K.B. 1826); King. v. Thompson, 169 Eng.
Rep. 1193 (E.B. 1825); State v. Wright, 1 N.C. App. 479, 162 S.E.2d 56 (1968).
88 Id.
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manslaughter, a finding of self-defense would exonerate the defendant. In
a non-homicide context, reasonable resistive force to an unlawful arrest
has been described by the courts as self-defense, exonerating the arrestee's resistance. 90
According to the Supreme Court, due process requires proof beyond a
reasonable doubt of the "facts in issue,"'91 because that "standard is
indispensible to command the respect and confidence of the community in
applications of the criminal law." 92 Moreover, the reasonable doubt
standard is a due process requirement because it serves a vital role in
protecting the accused's "interest of immense importance," for "he may
lose his liberty upon conviction and ... be stigmatized by the conviction." 93 To serve adequately the due process interests which prompted the
Winship holding, it seems imperative that the fact-finder consider
whether the arrest resisted was lawful. Under appropriate circumwhether it is
stances, a lawful arrest is a "fact in issue," regardless of
94
formally identified as an element of the offense charged.
The paramount due process interests, the community's respect for the
criminal justice system, and the accused's immensely important interest
in his liberty and stigmatization by conviction, are in jeopardy if the
fact-finder cannot consider whether the resistance was a reasonable and
understandable reaction to a wrongful attack, a trespass described as an
outrageous affront 95 to one's liberty. Surely "a society that values the
good name and freedom of every individual" 96 should not condemn a man
without due consideration as to whether he reacted reasonably to an
unlawful arrest, which is a wrongful denial of his liberty.
Of course, not every resistance to an unlawful arrest will be deemed
reasonable or blameless. A fact-finder may determine, under the facts of
a given case, that the resistance was not an instinctive defensible
reaction to the unlawful arrest, but rather an escape by a guilty mind. It
might be determined that, in some instances, the resistance was disproportionate to the liberty denial. The formalization of the crime-element
approach, as seen in the Hoover court's focus on whether a lawful arrest
is or is not an element of the crime, does not adequately afford an
appropriate consideration of a material fact. 97 That material fact is
whether the resistance was the product of a blameworthy mind. And that
material fact, so fundamentally basic in our system of justice, is most

90 See State v. Wright, 1 N.C. App. 479, 162 S.E.2d 56 (1968).
91 In re Winship, 397 U.S. at 368 (1970).
92

Id.

9 Id. at 363-64.
McMillian v. Pennsylvania, 477 U.S. 79, 86 (1986).
9 People v. Cherry, 307 N.Y. 308, 310-11, 121 N.E.2d 238, 240 (1954).
16 In re Winship, 397 U.S. at 363-64 (1970).
17 "[T]he reasonable-doubt standard is indispensible for it 'impresses on the trier of fact
the necessity of reaching a subjective state of certitude of the facts in issue."' Id. at 364.
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certainly determinable only if the fact-finder is properly allowed to
consider the lawfulness of the arrest resisted, a fact at issue.
Yet, the question of provocation and self-defense may be immaterial if
the lawfulness of the arrest is not an issue. If the fact-finder need not
decide if the defendant was resisting a lawful or unlawful arrest, it can
conclude guilt without sufficiently considering the blameworthiness of
his state of mind when he resisted. If lawful arrest is not an issue, it need
not be proved at all. The critical due process problem here is not the
appropriate standard of proof; rather, it is exclusion of a material fact
which might explain the resistance. There is something innately offensive and fundamentally unsound about convicting a person without
allowing the fact-finder to consider whether his was a reasonable reaction
to an unlawful attempt to seize his person. Most appropriate is the
Supreme Court's admonition: "one cannot be punished for failing to obey
the command of an officer if that command is itself violative of the
Constitution."9g

'8 Wright v. Georgia, 373 U.S. 284, 291-93 (1963).
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